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CASE SETTING AND BASIS FOR REHEARING
The Decision filed August 18, 1988 overlooked several critical
facts and misapprehended those facts and the law that should be
applied

in this case.

All

of

the

individual

Labrums whose

property was affected by the Partial Summary Judgment, as well as
their counsel, request rehearing.
Counsel for the Petitioners/Appellants herein certifies this
Petition is presented in good faith and not for delay.
The Court *s Opinion centered solely on the issue of counsel
for Appellants' alleged contempt of the Court Order signed March
4, 1985.

Discussion of points in the decision, including the

facts, jurisdiction of the Trial Court, exempt property claimed by
the Labrums, the Bankruptcy Court Stay Order, and contempt - - only
deal with counsel's alleged breach of the Trial Court's Order. The
Opinion overlooked many of the Trial Court's underlying procedural
and legal errors that were also part of the appeal.
The Notice of Appeal filed December 9, 1985 appealed as a
matter of right to the question of contempt.

It also appealed

the Interlocutory Orders issued by Judge Christoffersen of April
1, 1985, March 4, 1985, January 8, 1985, October 22, 1984, and
September 13, 1984.
are

referred

to

in

These Orders were part of the appeal.
the

Docketing

Statement

in

paragraph

They
3.

Discussion in footnotes 4 and 5 (Appellants' Brief pages 7 and 3)
refers to the understanding Appellants had from Justice Gordon Hall
through Mr. Butler, the Clerk, that these issues would also be
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considered by the Court.

The Opinion does not address these

matters. Since these were part of the setting before and after the
February 8, 1985 hearing took place, they need to be addressed.

ARGUMENT
Appellants consistently reminded the Trial Court of pleading
limits and procedural requirements and rules.

The Trial Court

should have been protecting them in their property and procedural
rights.

Yet, the Opinion fails to recognize: (1) Labrums' claim

for the return of their exempt property, and (2) Labrums' rights
to limit the Partial Summary Judgment to the pleadings.

Their

defense of the yet undecided Second and Third Causes of Action in
this lawsuit, as well as their Affirmative Defeases which have
never been ruled on, are at risk because of this misapprehension.
This Appeal was not of a final decision, but of some issues which
were ready to be appealed. The Opinion discusses the Trial Court's
ruling as if there are no other issues. There were, and they need
to be addressed too.

I.
MATERIAL FACTS WERE OVERLOOKED OR MISAPPREHENDED
WHICH SHOULD HAVE AFFECTED THE DECISION TO CAUSE
THE COURT BELOW TO BE REVERSED.
A.

LABRUMS ALSO APPEALED.
The Opinion says "Of the many issues raised by Malouf on

appeal, only one is dispositive . . . "

at the bottom of page 3.

Opinions of this Court often rest on one critical issue.

2

The

quoted

language refers to the source of more issues:

parties to this case, Labrums.
The

Labrums

are

important points.

also

the real

Malouf is not the only Appellant*

Appellants.

Labrums

raised

some

very

This Court, the final interpreter of Rules of

Procedure and Statutes in this State, focused its decision solely
on the question of contempt, isolating it from the circumstances.

B.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS TO BE LIMITED TO PLEADINGS.
The Court Opinion also overlooks the fact that the Summary

Judgment
Judgment .

entered

against

The Partial

Labrums
Summary

was

only

Judgment

a

that

Partial

Summary

the Trial

Court

authorised P.C.A. to execute writs on and serve garnishments on
conflicted with the First Cause of Action which the Partial Summary
Judgment was to be limited to. If the Court dealt with this issue,
raised in Appellants' Brief (pages 19 through 23) and Reply Brief
(pages 7 through 2 2 ) , it does not explain why the Trial Court was
not exceeding proper limits in doing this for P.C.A.

The First

Cause of Action in the Complaint asked for a deficiency judgment,
to be entered after a foreclosure sale.

Instead, the Trial Court

overlooked the limits of its own Partial Summary Judgment to allow
both a money judgment and an execution (not a foreclosure) sale.
There was never a foreclosure sale.

It then allowed a writ of

garnishment before there was a deficiency. The Trial Court did not
adhere to P.C.A.'s pleadings or the Rules.

If the Supreme Court

justifies that kind of justice, as it did by not considering those
issues in the Opinion, it encourages trial courts to re-write the
3

law based on political prejudices.

That is not the quality of

justice that should be available from either a trial court or a
court of last resort•
The Opinion overlooked the issues raised in Appellants' Brief
about the insufficient proof for P.C.A.'s Partial Summary Judgment.
It overlooked

the fact

that

P.C.A. was required

to make an

accounting pursuant to the Memorandum Decision issued November 21,
1984. (The decision was after the October 22, 1984 hearing. Record,
pages 213 and 214) .
The Partial Summary Judgment was only on the First Cause of
Action.
made.

The First Cause of Action required that an accounting be
No deficiency judgment was ever entered.

There was never

a verifiable correct amount for which either writs of execution or
writs of garnishment were entered.

The Supreme Court Opinion did

not rationalize why these facts were not addressed in its Opinion.
It should find that the Labrums' Constitutional rights to property
were seriously violated by the Plaintiff and the Trial Court.

C.

THE GARNISHMENT WAS NOT IN CONFORMITY WITH THE RULES.
All the foregoing were raised by the Appeal,

relate

to

whether

the Trial

Court

These issues

was considering

a

garnishment when the February 8, 1985 hearing took place.

legal
The

Opinion overlooks a fundamental property right all debtors have in
garnishments:
access

A garnishment writ does not allow a creditor any

or control over exempt property.

Rule 64D(e)(i) limits

garnishment attachment to only non-exempt property.
4

The writ can

only apply to non-exempt property •

The writ should advise each

garnishee:
• • . that he is attached as garnishee in the
action, and commanding him not to pay any debt
due or to become due to the defendant which is
not exempt from execution, and to retain
possession
and
control
of all
credits,
chattels, goods, effects, debts, choses in
action, money and personal property, and
rights to property of such defendant not
exempt from execution, until further order of
the Court. CRule 64D(e)(i)] Emphasis Added.
The whole reason there was a hearing February 8, 1985, was to
determine whether that writ of garnishment was legally sufficient.
The actual writ used by P.C.A. says nothing about exempt property.
The February 8th ruling did not recognize that Labrums claimed the
property to be exempt property.

Yet, the writ and the ruling were

all voidable for noncompliance with Rule 64D.

The Plaintiff did

not comply with it and neither did the Trial Court. This is a main
reason the underlying order by Judge Christoffersen was not valid.

D.
UNDERLYING ORDER WAS TO ANSWER QUESTIONS, AND BASED ON
ANSWERS, HOLD FUNDS.
The Opinion overlooks the fact

that

the February

8, 1985

Ruling (to hold funds for the benefit of the Trustee) was actually
stated by Judge Christoffersen to apply only to those funds which
the answers to the garnishment questions showed Malouf was holding
which should be turned over to the Labrums' Bankruptcy Trustee.
The Court said it assumed that all property held by Malouf that
belonged to the individual Labrums who filed bankruptcy would have
to be turned over to the Trustee.
5

The Judge repeated that belief

several times in the transcript of the February 8, 1985 hearing.
See page 18, lines 21 through 25; page 19, lines 7 through 9; and
page 25, lines 25 through page 26, line 2.

The Court:

• . . Yeah. It isn't against anybody, except
answer the questions . . . I assume . . . if
they're somebody that's filed bankruptcy, then
they go the trustee . . . (page 18) .
Well, it depends how you frame your questions
. . . and then he answers it depending on his
answers, if it's people who have filed
bankruptcy then that's trustee money . . . to
make a determination of what to do with it.
I guess it depends on the results of his
answers . . . (page 19) .
. . . I assume, since the bankruptcies are
filed, that they have the jurisdiction to make
the determination of what happens to the
assets anyway (page 25,26).
In each instance, the Court "assumes" the Bankruptcy trustee has
jurisdiction to decide the issue of who is ultimately entitled to
the property. That assumption explains why the Order was made the
way it was.

The Court's assumption was in fact, wrong.

Exempt

property is not turned over to the trustee as a matter of course.
If it is, the trustee has to properly ask for it in Bankruptcy
Court. Usually, property claimed as exempt is retained by the
debtor or a custodian.

Otherwise, trustees would have alot of

houses, cars, refrigerators, money, clothing and food they would
just have to give back.

This is consistent with the requirements

of the Bankruptcy Code at 11 U.S.C. Sections 541, 522(b) and 522(1)
allowing property to be exempted from the bankruptcy estate. This
was explained in Appellants' Brief pages 26 and 27, and the Reply

6

Brief on pages 22 and 23.

In any event, the Court assumed that

something should happen which in fact was not required by the law:
that

the exempt

property would

have to be turned

over

to the

Trustee.

E.

PROPERTY STATUS STILL NOT FINAL.
The Trial Court did not rule that the property Labrums claimed

was exempt was property the Trustee could distribute to P.C.A. or
other creditors.

Neither the Trial Court nor the Opinion justify

the right of the Trustee to hold exempt property under the facts,
including the fact that the Trustee did not follow Bankruptcy Rule
4003(b) or act within the time allowed by local Rule 25 to get the
benefit of the February 8, 1985 ruling.

Because this appeal is as

much the Labrums' as it is Malouf *s, and since the Labrums are
Appellants and parties, they have standing in the Trial Court and
on appeal to assert that the property was exempt.

The Trial Court

never had a hearing on the question whether it was in fact exempt.
No hearing was required either, inasmuch as it was claimed to be
exempt.

Under the Bankruptcy Rules just cited and argued in the

Briefs, and since the claim was not contested, the property is
exempt.
the

The Trial Court ruling on February 8, 1985, did not say

property

Labrums"

counsel

held

for

them

was

not

exempt.

Labrums' exemption claim in the bankruptcy Schedules and subsequent
answers

to

the

garnishment

questions

was

sufficient,

under

Bankruptcy Rules and under U.R.C.P. 64D, to allow them to retain
it, anywhere they wanted to.
7

F.

THE OPINION SHOULD HAVE CONSIDERED ACTUAL GARNISHMENT ANSWERS
MADE.
The Opinion overlooks the fact that on February 8, 1985,

answers to the writ of garnishment were neither required nor given.
The ruling

was that answers be made

later.

Therefore, the

statement of fact at the bottom of page two and the top of page
three misconstrues the intent of the Court's words about answers
to the questions:
The Trial Court nevertheless denied a motion
to dissolve a writ of garnishment and ordered
Malout
to
answer
the
interrogatories
accompanying the writ of garnishment.
In light of the automatic bankrutpcy stay, the
Court disallowed execution based on Malouf's
answers at the conclusion of the February 8,
hearing , but ordered Malouf to hold and safely
keep any and all property in his possession
belonging to the defendants herein for the
benefit of the trustee appointed in the
bankruptcy of said Defendants.
(Emphasis added.)
The Court ruling was not based on answers to the garnishment.
The Supreme Court Opinion wrongly grounds itself on the idea that
answers to the garnishment justified the Trial Court ruling to hold
the property.

The Trial Court, we've already discovered, assumed

that if the property belonged to someone who filed bankruptcy, then
the trustee would be entitled to possession.
been shown to be only an assumption.

That assumption has

The Opinion makes the

mistake of granting credence to the same assumption that Judge
Christoffersen erroneously made.

The Trial Court's intent should

be understood to mean that based on the answers to be given, the
Court assumed the property would have to be held for the Trustee.
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G.

LABRUMS PROPERLY CLAIMED THEIR EXEMPTION.
The Court did not want to rule on the question of who was

entitled to the property Labrums claimed to be exempt.

On page 19

of the February 8, 1985 Transcript, the Judge said:
. . . depending on his answers if it's people
who
have
filed
bankruptcy
then
that's
trustee's money, (page 19, lines 8 and 9)
This makes it clear the Court was leaving the ultimate question of
who was entitled to the property up to the Trustee.

This is one

reason the Utah Supreme Court should discuss any justification it
has

for

the

failure of

the Trustee

to

timely act. Under

Bankruptcy Court's own rules, the failure should

the

foreclose the

Trustee, P.C.A., and the Trial Court from control or claim for the
funds Labrums' counsel held.
fact that the bankruptcy

Any Opinion should not overlook the

filing February 5, 1985, preceded

the

February 8, 1985 hearing by three days.

Labrums* Schedules were

filed.

The Schedules disclosed

The automatic stay was in effect.

the Labrums' claims for exempt property.
their counsel, alleged

the money

The Labrums, not iust

was exempt

from

the writ of

garnishment, from any execution, and from the Bankruptcy Trustee.

H.

LABRUMS SHOULD KEEP THE MONEY.
The Supreme Court has impliedly recognized Labrums' standing

to raise their claim for the property's exemption on appeal by
holding the Trial Court Order (for Malouf to "hold" the funds for
the trustee) was valid.

If the Opinion comments on that underlying

ruling, it should review it thoroughly and more deeply than Judge
9

Wahlquist did.

The main requirement of the ruling was to answer

questions. The answers showed Labrums were entitled to keep the
property. Labrums' right to the property should be reviewed. Only
a Partial Summary Judgment was against them. No money judgment had
been validly entered.

Summary judgment was not entered against

three Labrums who filed bankruptcy February 5, 1985. See page 7,
Appeal Brief Mote 4.
The Opinion refers to the fact that when ordered by the
Bankruptcy Court to turn over the milk diversion funds, Malouf
turned over $41,299.83. It implies the $5,360.12 that was not paid
was milk diversion money. It was neither milk diversion nor rental
income, and should not have had any bearing on the Bankruptcy Court
Order.

It is unfair to counsel and shows the Supreme Court

misapprehended

the true facts, when the Opinion suggests the

$5,360.12 retained was also part of the milk diversion money.

It

was not. See page 23 of the Reply Brief.
The Opinion does not explain away the fact that the Bankruptcy
Trustee, for whose benefit the Order after February 8, 1985 was
exclusively made, neither sought in Bankruptcy Court nor State
Court to have the exemption claims of Labrums set aside, nor did
he ever seek a ruling that he was entitled to the funds.

He was

time-barred from receiving the funds which Labrums claimed in their
February 5, 1985 Schedules to be exempt property.

The Trustee

either forgot or he agreed with the exempt property claim.

The

Order requiring that the funds once held by Malouf be turned over
to

the

Trustee

was

made

in

excess
10

of

the

Trial

Court *s

jurisdiction, because a prior equivalent order had not been made.
This Court should uphold the integrity of the Utah Exemptions
Act

by reversing

Judge Wahlquist 's Order

entitled to the 321,268.12.

that

the Trustee was

Labrums had claimed money still held

by their counsel to be exempt property; and the Trustee's failure
to exercise any rights he may have had became moot when he did not.
It is simply incorrect law that the Trustee is always entitled to
hold exempt property while he is deciding whether it is exempt or
not.

See page 12 of Labrums' Reply Brief.
Neither the Trial Court nor the Opinion rationalized away the

Act of Congress saying that milk diversion proceeds should not be
available

to

creditors.

Authority

for

this

was

raised

in

Appellants' Reply Brief, Addendums A-4, A-5 , A-6, and particularly
A-7 (Point II) the Trustee could be presumed to have realized that
milk

diversion

monies, claimed

exempt

by

Labrums, should

not

ultimately be available for creditors and should not come into his
hands.

I.

TRIAL COURT DID NOT ADEQUATELY CONSIDER EXEMPTION QUESTION.
The Opinion minimizes the exempt property claims for the funds

held by Malouf for Labrums.

The Opinion says that the ultimate

question of their exempt status was " . . . doubtful on this record.
. ." (Page 5 ) .

But, that was not the issue before the Trial Court.

It wasn't the issue because the Trial Court did not think Labrums
property rights mattered because they had filed for bankruptcy.
(See February 8, 1985 Transcript page 7, lines 16 through 18; page
11

8, line 12 through page 10, line 2; page 11, lines 4 through 9;
page 11, line 20 through page 12, line 9; page ±2, line 10 through
page 13, line 10; page 23, line 20 through page 25, line 13; and
page 25, line 25.

The point is that the Labrumis were entitled to

claim the exemptions in the Bankruptcy Court, which they did. The
Trial Court assumed the claim was either invalid or not allowed or
would

conflict

with

the Trustee.

However, the claim

was one

Labrums were entitled to make, was supported by the Utah Exemption
Act, Bankruptcy

law, and the Act of Congress creating

diversion funds, and was not contested.
the time the contempt hearing was held.

the milk

These facts were known at
The Trial Court should

have granted Labrums the presumption that their claim for exempt
property was valid.

In their appeal, it is Labrums, and not just

Malouf, that argue that funds were exempt.

Labrums are the real

Appellants in this whole matter.

J.

TRUSTEE'S RIGHTS BECAME MOOT.
The Opinion misapprehends the length of time the Trustee had

to act to get the benefit of Judge Christoffersen*s February 8,
1985 Ruling.
the ruling

It assumes he had forever.
was valid

Even if the Court assumes

(i.e. it was based

on a proper

summary

judgment; entered against the right parties; was consistent with
the First Cause of Action; was for a verifiably correct amount; and
the garnishment being discussed at the hearing was valid —

none

of which points were discussed in the Opinion) , the Order did not
allow the Trustee an indefinite period to act. When he finally did
12

act by a token joining at P.C.A.'s invitation in the Motion for
Contempt, it was months after the time had passed for him to take
any action.

The Order only required Malouf to hold the funds for

the benefit of the Trustee, and the Trustee did not act within the
time he could get any benefit.

The Trustee's

least be explained away by the Opinion.
allowable time to act?
ordering

waiver should at

Why can he wait past the

What business did Judge Wahlquist have in

the Trustee to have the funds paid

Christoffersen never got to that issue?
held to be entitled to the funds.

to him when Judge

The creditor was never

The underlying Order never did

require the funds to be turned over to the Trustee.

The Labrums*

counsel needed only to hang on to them if the Trustee was entitled
to them based on the answers to the garnishment.
"assumption"

The Court's

(February 8, 1985 Transcript, pages 18, 23 and 25)

that the assets would go to the Trustee in any event, was not part
of the ruling.

The transcript says at page 23, lines 7 through 10:

Okay.
So what you need now is an order
requiring him t_o answer the writ . . . and
that i_f_ there are any funds held b£ reason of
the answers to the writ that they cannot be
executed upon but must be held . . . for the
benefit of the trustee, for decision as to
what should happen to the funds,
(.Emphasis Added) .
Obviously, if the garnishment question answers showed the Trustee
wasn't entitled to the funds, there would be no need to hold them
for him for any period.
gets

the funds

in all

That language does not say the Trustee
cases.

The answers made

legally

took

advantage of the language in U.R.C.P. Rule 64D, which excludes

13

exempt

property

from

the effect

of

the writ.

P.C.A's proper

recourse was to attack the answers, not Labrums' attorney.

The

Opinion does not explain why the Supreme Court could uphold Judge
Wahlquist's change to the Trial Court's original ruling to give
property to the Trustee which he was never ordered or entitled to
receive in the first place.
The Opinion as written can only be supported if it assumes the
Labrums are not appealing P.C.A.'s Partial Summary Judgment or the
validity of the writ of garnishment.

They are.

Their presence or

rights as Appellants was not explained away by the Opinion.

CONCLUSION
Contempt exists only if there is disobedience of any lawful
judgment.

The question the Court should re-hear is whether the

ruling on February 8, 1985 was lawful in light of the facts which
have been misapprehended.

The Labrums and their counsel could

agree that as stated February 8th the ruling was lawful:
had

to answer

the garnishment

questions, and

Malouf

if those answers

showed the Trustee was entitled to the property, he had to hold the
property for the benefit of the Trustee.

That was not the same as

an order that the Trustee actually receive the funds.
Where the funds were claimed to be exempt and the Trustee
never acted to change Labrums' exemption claim and ran out of time
to challenge

the exemption

claim

long

before

this motion

for

contempt was brought, the underlying ruling should have been found
to

have

been

moot, unenforceable
14

or

void

by

the

time

Judge

Wahlquist heard the matter, if not much earlier.

See Reply Brief,

pages 26, 27, and Appellants1 Brief, pages 22 and 23. The Trustee
had plenty of opportunity to act for his own benefit
wanted

to.

He did

not.

Contempt

if he had

of Labrums * counsel

is an

inappropriate remedy.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 30th day of August, 1988.

Raymond N. Malouf
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